杨 理
摘要：共享性自然资源治理至今仍然没有普适性的解决策略。本文通过对中国草原承包制度改革的回顾，发现草原承包制度实施初期引起了草原普遍性退化，进一步分析却表明草原退化的主要原因不是草原承包制度不符合国情，而是草原承包制度实施初期产权的强制性保护不足。而中国能够逆转共享性草原利用的困境，成功的经验在于：政府加强保护产权体系的强制性，尤其是2008年以后，中国在草原土地制度改革中加强了政府执行力去保护产权，采取了界限清晰到户、确权登记等措施；而且，中国政府并不强制指定草地产权，这不但缓解了界定公共资源私有产权成本高的困境，而且在实践中逐渐探索出具有中国特色的草地共享产权体系——草原承包制度融合草畜平衡制度的共享产权。
关键词： 草原家庭承包制度；共享产权；草地产权制度；共享性自然资源
【作 者】杨理，博士，内蒙古大学经济管理学院经济系蒙古高原生态学与资源利用教育部重点实验室教授。
【Title】Research on Grassland Tenure Reform and Governance Experience in China
Abstract: There is still no universal solution to common resources governance. From the research of grassland tenure reform in China, this paper finds that nationwide grassland degradation happened after implementation of the grassland contract system, and the main degradation reason is the lack of property rights protection in the early stage of the implementation of the grassland contract system. So China has strengthened the government's executive power to protect property rights in the grassland land system reform after 2008, and adopted measures such as clear boundaries to households, confirmation and registration of tenure rights, etc. Moreover, China does not forcibly designate grassland property rights, nor does China follow the contract system in agricultural areas, even not refused the privatization tendency. As a result, a grassland shared property rights system with Chinese characteristics has been gradually explored in practice: the grassland contract policy integrates the grassland and livestock balance policy. The successful experiences learned from Chinese grassland tenure reform is that government only provide protection of property rights system instead of defining property rights. So the Chinese grassland tenure could adjust to the shared property rights.
Key words: The Grassland Household Contract Responsibility System, Shared property rights, Grassland tenure system, Common-Pool resources