王越端
摘 要：通过对比美国、印度、土耳其、以色列、俄罗斯和新加坡六个国家，本文比较了司法系统在不同的政治制度下的行为模式：对应参与/多元民主政体的多数主义模式，对应精英民主政体的反多数主义模式、对应权威政体的权威主义模式。无论在哪一类政治体制下，由于政治主权的拥有者均可通过行政、立法、修宪乃至制宪等方法对法院进行奖惩，司法系统的判决大致都会反映政治主权者的利益和政策。同时，司法系统也可以利用政治主权者的支持，在一定程度上加强或保持自身相对于议会和行政机关的独立性。本文部分填补了当下的司法政治研究在跨体制比较方面的缺失，并为分析司法行为和政治权力之间的关系提供了一个较为普适性的思路。
关键词：司法行为;政治主权;多数主义;反多数主义;权威主义
【作者】王越端，北京大学政府管理学院助理教授。
【Title】Judicial Behavior and Political Sovereignty: A Typology
Abstract：Using the U.S., India, Turkey, Israel, Russia, and Singapore as case studies, the paper compares the three models of judicial behavior under different political systems: the majoritarian model under participatory/pluralist democracies, the countermajoritarian model under elitist democracies, and the authoritarian model under authoritarian systems. The paper finds that, regardless of the political context, a judiciary’ decisions will generally reflect the interests and political priorities of the political sovereign. This is largely due to the latter’s ability to punish and reward the courts through executive, legislative, and constitutional means. However, the judiciary may also leverage the support of the political sovereign to strengthen its independence from the executive and legislative branches. The study thus adds to the literature on comparative judicial politics and provides a more universal approach towards the relationship between judicial behavior and political power.
Keywords: Judicial behavior, Political sovereignty, Majoritarianism, Countermajoritarianism, Authoritarianism